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Attorneys' Fees in Chapter 11 Reorganizations:
A Case for Modified Procedures
BRENDA HACKER OSBORNE*
INTRODUCTION
Most attorneys expect to be paid for their work. In bankruptcy, however, an
attorney might not receive compensation for work performed in good faith
while representing the debtor in possession ("DIP"). Recent court decisions
have applied provisions of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code") pertaining to
conflicts of interest inconsistently' These cases have denied fees and
disqualified professional persons without providing consistent bases for their
decisions. Consequently, an attorney may spend hundreds of hours represent-
ing a client only to have a court decide that the attorney will receive no
compensation from the bankruptcy estate.
Uncertainty regarding compensation may force many attorneys to tailor
certain decisions about the bankruptcy representations in order to increase
their chances of compensation. Many of these decisions should be left to the
clients. For example, an attorney must be careful not to aid the client in any
action that the court might later not compensate. This is no simple task in
Chapter 11 bankruptcies, where existing equity holders may have a continuing
interest and role to play in the reorganized entity How much should the
owners' interests be considered? This is not a decision for the DIP's attorney
to make. Yet, attorneys may feel compelled to make this type of decision in
order to receive compensation for their work.
To take this pressure off attorneys, and to allow clients to make the
business decisions, this Note advocates implementing greater disclosure
procedures throughout the representation. This would allow the court,
creditors, and other interested parties to examine the DIP's and attorney's
actions as they are taking place and to object immediately to any undesirable
actions. Under current bankruptcy procedures, objections to fees based on
conflicts of interest need only be raised when an attorney is petitioning for
fees either at an interim period or at the conclusion of the representation. The
court, in responding to an objection, does not decide that the attorney's work
is compensable until the work is complete.
* J.D. expected, May, 1994, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I wish to thank
Professor Bruce Markell for his suggestions and patience in reading various drafts of this Note.
1. In reconciling the competing bankruptcy goals of vindicating creditors' claims and providing
debtor relief, "courts simply aren't unanimous on how these conflicts ought to be reconciled-and
sometimes it is hard to find internal consistency, even within a single court" John D. Ayer, Professional
Responsibility in Bankruptcy Cases, in BANKRUPTCY ETHics REVisITED 2-5 (1992).
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Implementing new procedures for disclosure and review during the
bankruptcy would provide greater guidance for the DIP's counsel throughout
the representation. New procedures would facilitate approval of client conduct
before counsel expends large amounts of time on the representation. With
increased guidance, an attorney is less likely to waste time on work that the
court will not compensate and is more likely to allow the DIP to make
important business decisions that the client normally makes outside of
bankruptcy
Part I of this Note discusses the Bankruptcy Code's procedures for
representing a DIP, the courts' inconsistent application of these procedures,
and the role of counsel in representing a DIP Part II explores the reasons that
attorneys in bankruptcy proceedings make business decisions. Part III
proposes a solution to the problems referred to throughout the
Note-increasing disclosure requirements and providing greater opportunity
for review
I. REPRESENTING THE DEBTOR IN POSSESSION
A. Procedures for Approval
The Bankruptcy Code permits the DIP, with court approval, to employ one
or more attorneys to represent or assist the DIP in carrying out its duties.2 To
employ an attorney, the DIP must submit an application for employment to
the court for approval.3 The attorney should submit a verified personal
statement with the application. The statement should describe all interests the
attorney has in the case and reveal all relationships the attorney has with
interested parties.4 The judge then examines the statement and either approves
the attorney's retention or disapproves and disqualifies the attorney
In examining the statement, the court looks for any relationships or interests
that might create a conflict for the attorney and interfere with the attorney's
duty to fairly represent the DIP 5 When representing any client, an attorney
must be free from conflicts of interest.6 In bankruptcy, this is especially
important.7
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a), 1107(a) (1988).
3. BANKR. R. 2014.
4. BANKR. R. 2014(a). The attorney must set forth any connections with the debtor, creditors, any
other party in interest, along with their respective attorneys and accountants, the trustee, and any party
employed by the trustee. Id.
5. In re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor, Inc., 45 B.R. 160 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984). "[T]he trustee
[DIP] may employ one or more attorneys that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to
the estate, and that are disinterested persons " 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
6. In re WPMK, Inc., 42 B.R. 157, 161 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984) ("This court has said on more than
one occasion that attorneys have a duty to exercise independent professional judgment free from
compromising influences and loyalties.'); Paine v. Chrysler (In re Paine), 14 B.R. 272, 274 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1981) (citing to common law rule that an attorney, as early as the seventeenth century, was
prohibited from representing conflicting interests).
7. One historical purpose behind the specific prohibitions of § 327 is to keep the bankruptpy from
being controlled by those with conflicting self-interests:
[Vol. 69:581
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Both the rules of professional responsibility and certain provisions of the
Code, which incorporate specific no-conflict-of-interest requirements, govern
conflicts of interest in bankruptcy.' Courts use the approval process for
representing the DIP and the power to disqualify or limit the compensation of
DIP-employed professionals to enforce the rules against conflicts of interest.9
For a court to approve an attorney under the specific Code requirements, the
attorney must be "disinterested" and must not hold an "adverse interest" to the
estate.' ° Though these requirements may appear rather straightforward, courts
have inconsistently applied them, creating confusion for the bankruptcy
attorney.
B. Inconsistent Court Decisions in Approval Process
The courts have produced a variety of inconsistent decisions concerning the
approval process. For example, courts have inconsistently applied Code
provisions pertaining to prepetition fees. Under § 101(14)(A)," an attorney
who is a creditor of the debtor is not "disinterested" and thus does not meet
the requirements of § 327 for approval. However, courts have not been
consistent in deciding whether being owed prepetition fees will be enough to
disqualify an attorney under § 327 For example, in Pierce v. Aetna Life
[Vital functions which in the past have been performed by inside groups or by protective
committees seeking personal profit, will be vested m the trustee No longer will the basic,
all-important phases of reorganization be performed by groups which have a selfish interest to
protect and promote.
In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1937)); see also In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., 135 B.R. 78, 90
(Bankr. N.D. I11. 1990) ("The basic principles underlying the conflict of interest prohibition take on an
added dimension when applied to those representing a bankruptcy estate. Thus, the rules are
more strictly applied in the bankruptcy context ").
8. In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 832-37 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), affid in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 75 B.R. 402 (Bankr. C.D. Utah 1987). "Taken together, the provisions of Sections 327(a)
and 101(13) [now 101(14)] and Canons 1, 4, 5, 6, and 9, of the present Codes of Professional
Responsibility prohibit attorneys practicing before this Court from representing conflicting interests. This
prohibition is not new." Id. at 837.
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327-328 (1988).
In order to effectively police participation by professionals in bankruptcy cases, particularly
those who seek compensation out of the assets of the estate, the Bankruptcy Code provides the
court with a variety of powerful weapons including most importantly total or partial
disqualification and reduction or denial of fees.
Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. at 88.
10. I1 U.S.C. §§ 327, 1107(b). To be "disinterested," an attorney must not be a creditor, equity
security holder, or insider of the debtor, must not be or have been within two years of the bankruptcy
filing a director, officer, or employee of the debtor, and, must not have an interest materially adverse
to the interest of the estate, any class of creditors, or equity security holders. I 1 U.S.C. § 101(14) (Supp.
IV 1992). "Adverse interest" is not defined by the Code, but to "hold an interest adverse to the estate"
has been defined by the courts in the following manner
(I) [T]o possess or assert any economic interest that would tend to lessen the value of the
bankruptcy estate or that would create either an actual or potential dispute in which the estate
is a rival claimant; or (2) to possess a predisposition under circumstances that render such a
bias against the estate.
In re Glenn Elec. Sales Corp., 89 B.R. 410, 413 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1988); Roberts, 46 B.R. at 827.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A).
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Insurance Co. (In re Pierce),2 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision that counsel was not disinterested because counsel was a creditor of
the debtor and held a mortgage in the debtor's property to secure payment of
post-petition services." In the case of In re Heatron, Inc.,"4 however, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled that being a
creditor of the debtor does not disqualify counsel from representing the
DIP." In re Heatron "seems to be an aberration, though it is often authorita-
tively cited." 6
Courts have also split on how to apply the "disinterested" requirement.
Some courts view the requirement as a standard to be applied with discretion
when examining the interests and relationships of the attorney 17 These
courts are more concerned with the effects the relationship or interest has on
the attorney's ability to represent the DIP-whether the interest would color
the independent and impartial attitude of the attorney-not whether the
interest or relationship exists.'" Other courts, however, have said that the
existence of a questionable interest or relationship is sufficient to require
disqualification without looking at the effects the relationship or interest has
on the attorney's performance. 9
Courts have also split over the question of whether an attorney may engage
in multiple representation. For example, may an attorney represent the DIP
and the debtor or debtor's owners in the same proceeding? One court said that
such dual representation is permissible as long as the attorney is not forced
into a position where she must choose between conflicting duties,2" while
another court said that dual representation without conflicts is impossible.2'
12. Pierce, 809 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1987).
13. Id. at 1362; see also Roberts, 46 B.R. at 820-23.
14. Heatron, 5 B.R. 703 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
15. Id. at 705.
16. Patti Williams, Bankruptcy Code Section 327(a)-New Interpretation Forces Attorneys to Waive
Fees or Wave Good-Bye to Clients, 53 Mo. L. REV. 309, 316 (1988); see also In re Microwave Prods.
of Am., Inc., 94 B.R. 971 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Best Western Heritage Inn Partnership, 79
B.R. 736 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 15 B.R. 890, 891 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1981), appeal dismissed, 707 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1983). But see In re Jaimalito's Cantina
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 114 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1990); In re Glenn Elec. Sales Corp., 89 B.R.
410 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1988); In re Pulliam, 96 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
17. Roberts, 46 B.R. at 828 (citing to cases which conclude that the disinterestedness standard is
merely a guideline for courts to follow when exercising discretion).
18. In re O'Connor, 52 B.R. 892, 899 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (agreeing that the test for
disinterestedness should be applied rigidly, but not blindly).
19. In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 753 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Chou-Chen
Chems., Inc., 31 B.R. 842, 851 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re King Resources Co. 20 B.R. 191, 204
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1982). The definition of "disinterestedness" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E) is "broad
enough to include anyone who in the slightest degree might have some interest or relationship that
would color the independent and impartial attitude required by the Code." 2 COLLiER ON BANKRUPTCY
327.03, at 327-38.1 (15th ed. 1985).
20. In re Hoffrnan, 53 B.R. 564 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985). The court states that a disqualifying
conflict does not necessarily exist in every case of dual representation. Whether dual representation is
permissible is a question to be determined on a case-by-case basis since in some situations it is too
cumbersome to always require separate counsel. Id. at 566; see also In re Lyons Transp. Lines, Inc., 144
B.R. 32 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
21. In re 765 Assocs., 14 B.R. 449, 451 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981) (stating that any advice an attorney
representing the DIP partner renders to general partners is improper). See generally Ayer, supra note
[Vol. 69:581
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One area where courts are in agreement involves the disclosure requirements
for initial approval. When examining the Application for Employment of the
attorney, a court looks at the attorney's past actions and relationships with
interested parties in the bankruptcy proceeding. In the verified Statement of
Connections accompanying the application, the attorney must disclose all such
past actions and relationships that a court would find relevant to its decision
of whether to approve or disapprove the attorney.Y Courts agree that the
burden rests on the attorney to disclose every interest and relationship that
might be relevant, not just those the attorney thinks the court will consider
important.23 Good faith does not matter when the court determines, with the
benefit of hindsight, whether the attorney adequately disclosed all factors that
might have created a conflict of interest.24 Courts have consistently held that
they will only consider whether the factor is disclosed, and even if an
undisclosed relationship does not result in a conflict of interest, failure to
disclose that relationship may be enough to justify denial of fees.25
C. Inconsistent Court Decisions Involving Future Actions
Inconsistencies in court decisions applying the Code's "disinterested" and
"no adverse interest" requirements are not limited to initial approval of the
attorney Courts are not ift complete agreement on how to handle future
actions and relationships that develop dunng the bankruptcy-actions that
might create a conflict of interest for the attorney. If a court decides that such
future actions and relationships create a conflict, there may be cause for
disqualification:
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code specifically gives the court power to
remove a professional previously retained by the estate who no longer
satisfies the requirements of § 327(a). Nevertheless, there is little doubt
that the court has inherent power to remove a professional who would be
disqualified from employment by the estate on a prospective basis. In effect
the approval of the court contemplated by § 327(a) implies continuous
approval.
26
I, at 2-15 to 2-17 (1992) (discussing dual representations in bankruptcy).
22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
23. The court has no duty to search the record to find conflicts, so it is the attorney's duty to bring
any possible conflicting interests or relationships to the court's attention. In re Glenn Elec. Sales Corp.,
89 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D. NJ. 1988); In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 839 (Bankr. C.D. Utah 1985), affid in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
24. Roberts, 46 B.R. at 839; see also In re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor, Inc., 45 B.R. 160, 168
(Bankr. D. Arm 1984).
25. In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 B.R. 643, 648 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986) ("Lack of
disclosure of relevant information necessary for an informed ruling on a debtor's application for the
employment of an attorney is grounds for the denial of a fee application.'); Roberts, 46 B.R. at 847;
Guy Apple, 45 B.R. at 163 ("Failure to disclose the facts giving rise to a conflict of interest may be
grounds for denial of compensation wholly apart from the act of representing conflicting interests.");
In re Arlan's Dep't Stores, Inc., 615 F.2d 925, 934-37 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that the lower court judge
ultimately based his decision on a lack of fill disclosure).
26. In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., 135 B.R. 78, 89 n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (citations omitted).
19941
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Consequently, even though a court initially approves the employment of an
attorney to represent the DIP, the court reserves the right to disapprove
counsel's employment or to deny counsel's compensation if a disqualifying
conflict of interest develops.27 There is no guarantee that, after a court
approves an attorney and the attorney begins working for the DIP, the court
will not disqualify the attorney in the future. There is also no guarantee that,
even with approval, a court will compensate an attorney for all the work done
for the DIP 28
One reason for inconsistent decisions concerning counsel's future actions
and relationships is that courts disagree over what constitutes a "conflict" for
the purposes of the § 327 conflict prohibition. Some courts have created a
distinction between types of conflicts by dividing them into groups of "actual"
and "potential" conflicts.2 9 These courts hold that only actual conflicts
mandate disqualification or denial of fees.3" A conflict is not actual unless
it is likely to inhibit the attorney's professional judgment by forcing the
attorney to choose between conflicting duties and interests.3'
The problem with making this distinction is that a court may approve an
attorney after finding that no actual conflict exists yet later disqualify her or
deny her compensation once a potential conflict becomes an actual conflict.3 2
For example, in the case of In re Diamond Mortgage Corp.,33 counsel for the
DIP was approved after the bankruptcy court decided that the existence of
counsel's prepetition claim against the debtor was only a potential conflict.
When counsel applied for final compensation, however, the court did not grant
the full request. The court found that over the course of the representation,
counsel's potential conflict ripened into an actual conflict. For this reason, the
court limited counsel's fees.34
Under present bankruptcy procedures, the concept of potential conflicts of
interest is harmful "not only to the interests of the Debtors, but to the
27. Roberts, 46 B.R. at 835, 845 (stating that a court can disqualify counsel from a case solely on
the basis of an appearance of impropriety).
28. See I I U.S.C. § 328(c); Roberts, 46 B.R. at 845.
29. In re O'Connor, 52 B.R. 892, 897 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (discussing the reasons an attorney
is in the best position to determine whether a conflict exists).
An actual conflict of interest has been defined as "an active competition between two
interests, in which one interest can only be served at the expense of the other." In contrast,
a potential conflict of interest has been defined as "one in which the competition is presently
dormant, but may become active if certain contingencies occur."
Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.t1 at 90 (citations omitted).
30. In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175 (lst Cir. 1987); Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. 78. But see In re
Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.RL 742, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
31. Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. at 92; In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 B.R. 643, 653
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986); In re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor, Inc., 45 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1984).
32. "In determining whether to sanction an attorney whose conflict of interest is only potential, the
following factors will be considered: 2. The foreseeability or likelihood that the potential conflict
will become an actual conflict[.]" Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.RL at 92.
33. Id. at 78.
34. Id. at 93.
[Vol. 69:581
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attorneys in the case. ' 5 The DIP is harmed when its counsel is disqualified
after working on the case. 6 Attorneys are harmed since they essentially put
in hours of work for free. Reserving a decision on whether an actual conflict
exists until after work has been completed is unfair, especially because
attorneys are not provided with clear means to avoid being disqualified or
denied fees.
At least one court has rejected interpretations of § 327 that find a difference
between actual conflicts and potential conflicts in an attempt to eliminate this
unfairness. Under the analysis in In re Kendavis Industries International,
Inc.," once a conflict is apparent, it is deemed a conflict; it is not merely a
potential one that could develop into an actual one. Kendavis thus provides
a bright-line rule for interpreting § 327 where any conflict will result in
disqualification.38
This holding still does not solve the problem, and courts which recognize
a difference between potential and actual conflicts are probably taking the
more realistic approach to the approval process. In Kendavis, the court found
that counsel had an implied agreement with shareholders of the debtor which
created a conflict of interest. The Kendavis court did not decide that the
totality of evidence showed an implied agreement with shareholders until the
representation had already taken place. 39 Kendavis illustrates that even
without recognizing a distinction between actual and potential conflicts, it is
difficult to determine at the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding--dunng
the initial attorney approval stage-that an implied agreement creating a fatal
conflict of interest exists. An implied agreement between any party in
bankruptcy and an attorney representing the DIP is almost impossible to show
without actually examining the attorney's conduct during the reorganization.
Kendavis traps attorneys in a no-win situation. The Kendavis court ruled
that the relationships an attorney has with shareholders and manage-
ment-relationships that courts would describe as creating "potential"
conflicts are "actual" conflicts. Yet, the court admitted that the attorney is
expected to have some sort of relationship with these possibly adverse parties
since "in reality . . an attorney for a debtor corporation expressly or
35. In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.RL 742, 753 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); see also Marine
Power, 67 B.R. at 653 ("The public policy is to avoid even potentially conflicting situations.') (citation
omitted).
36. Disqualification after representation of the debtor has begun has the inequitable effect of
denying the estate benefits "obtained by the retention of counsel already familiar with the debtor's
affairs." In re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor, Inc., 45 B.R. 160, 167 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984); see also
Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. at 92 (citing In re Quakertown Glass Co., 73 B.R. 468,470 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987)).
37. Kendavis, 91 B.R. 742.
38. As the court stated:
[W]henever counsel for a debtor corporation has any agreement, express or implied, with
management or a director of the debtor, or with a shareholder, or with any control party, to
protect the interest of that party, counsel holds a conflict. That conflict is not potential, it is
actual, and it arises the date that representation commences.
Id. at 754; see also In re Vanderbilt Assocs., Ltd., III B.R. 347, 356 (Bankr. D. Utah), rev'd, 117 B.R.
678 (D. Utah 1990).
39. Kendavis, 91 B.R. at 751.
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impliedly accepts certain obligations of advice or aid to equity holders,
management directors, and the like."4 ° Under this decision, the extent to
which an attorney can act on these "obligations" without creating a conflict
with the attorney's duty to the DIP is uncertain.
D Role of Counsel in Representing the Debtor in Possession
An attorney representing a DIP in a Chapter 11 reorganization is represent-
ing an entity that has been established for the benefit of others. "[I]n the
bankruptcy context[,] attorneys are representing debtors who are
equivalent to trustees acting in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the
[interested parties] in the case."'" Management, which ran the debtor
company before filing the bankruptcy petition, takes the role of DIP and
continues to run the company after the petition has been filed. The DIP is a
separate entity from, and has different obligations than, the debtor company
even with the same management in control.
In representing the DIP, as with representing any client, an attorney's duty
is to use her independent, professional judgment to act in the best interest of
the DIP 42 To act in the best interest of the DIP is to act in the best interest
of the bankruptcy estate since the DIP's duty is to the estate.43 Many courts
have defined the DIP's duty to the estate as the duty to maximize its value.44
A pure maximization goal, however, may have shortcomings.45
Because bankruptcy is a collective proceeding, 46 representing the best
interests of the estate means taking into consideration the competing interests
of multiple parties involved in the bankruptcy Shareholders of the debtor
entity are included in this group of parties whose interests are to be
considered. To some, this may come as a surprise because it is commonly
believed that in bankruptcy, creditor interests are the only interests of
concern.47 The DIP has an obligation to creditors, but "the view that
40. Id. at 755.
41. In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 B.R. 643, 648 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986); see also id.
at 654; In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1021 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) ("If the case is in Chapter
11, the debtor will be a debtor in possession, and hence the trustee or fiduciary for the estate.").
42. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 2.1 (1992).
43. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRT'rcY 208-10 (1992).
44. In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Vanderbilt Assocs., Ltd., I II
B.R. 347, 352 (Bankr. D. Utah), rev'd, 117 B.R. 678 (D. Utah 1990); see also BAID, supra note 43,
at 208-09.
45. For criticisms of estate maximization principle, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 669, 780-87 (1993) [hereinafter Corporate Governance].
46. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 749 (2d ed. 1990).
47. Many cases support this notion by stating that the DIP's role in bankruptcy is to maximize the
value of the estate for the benefit of creditors. Central Ice Cream, 836 F.2d at 1072; Vanderbilt Assocs.,
111 B.R. at 352. The DIP does have a duty to maximize the value of the estate for creditors' benefit,
but this does not mean that creditors must be served to the detriment of equity. No courts have held that
[Vol. 69:581
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managers owe fiduciary duties only to creditors fails to recognize the very
real interest that shareholders can have in tae management of [insolvent]
companies. ' 4 In any reorganization, shareholders have residuary interests in
the estate after the creditors' claims have been satisfied.49 In reorganizations
'of small companies, shareholders may have even greater and more powerful
interests when existing owners provide certain value to the entity that another
owner is not capable of providing."0 The added value may be in the form of
capital, supplies, or expertise.5' Thus, even though creditors' interests are
superior, the interests of the bankruptcy estate may be best served by
considering owners' interests as well.
Courts have not decided how much a DIP should take owners' interests into
account:
"We" (meaning: the sovereign, the polity, the system[] haven't really made
up our mind how far the trustee/DIP should be able to go in protecting the
debtor, at the creditors' expense. It would be possible to design a system
of bankruptcy that served the interests of creditors only. Up to now, we
have been unwilling to go that far. But we seem to have a bit of a bad
conscience about it. We'll let the debtor go a ways, but not too far. And
we have a way of changing the rules from case to case-sometimes even
in mid-case. 2
Thus, as will be discussed in following sections, an attorney has little
guidance in counseling the DIP in forming a plan in which owners' interests
are considered. Finding the "right" plan-one that does not give undue weight
to owners' interests-is especially important to an attorney since court
decisions have shown that the "wrong" plan may have grave implications for
the attorney's compensation.
the DIP must select a mode of maximzation that harms equity in order to satisfy creditors faster, when
another alternative exists which serves creditors' as well as equity's interests.
48. Corporate Governance, supra note 45, at 708. "We conclude that the better view is that
management 'owes' fiduciary duties to both the creditors and the shareholders of an insolvent company."
Id. at 709.
49. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 143 (1990) [hereinafter
Bargaining over Equity's Share] (stating that m 21 of 30 settlement cases studied where the debtor
company was insolvent, "creditors agreed to allow shareholder recovenes ranging from $400,000 to $63
million"); see also Corporate Governance, supra note 45, at 683-84.
50. "[i]n the reorganization cases of small businesses in which managers are also the principal
shareholders, equity frequently dominates the bargain. The dependence of the business upon the
continuing services of the shareholder-manager is the primary bargaining leverage used to accomplish
this feat." Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 49, at 149.
51. See BAiRD & JACKSON, supra note 46, at 231, 246-54. If the existing ownership can provide
such additional value then the owner will have bargaining leverage in the reorganization. Id. at n.15.
To obtain the highest value for the bankruptcy estate, the interests of the owner will have to be
considered.
52. Ayer, supra note 1, at 2-5 to 2-6.
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II. ATTORNEYS MAKING BUSINESS JUDGMENT DECISIONS
A. Business Judgment Decisions in Bankruptcy
Determining how much shareholders should be involved in the reorganiza-'
tion is a business, not a legal, decision; it requires business experience or
education to make. Thus, those who understand the debtor company are better
able to make this decision. 3 By definition, an attorney who meets the
"disinterested" and "no adverse interest" requirements in order to represent
the DIP probably is not the individual who possesses the most experience with
the inner workings of the debtor entity Though the attorney will have or
develop an understanding of the debtor entity, the client probably hired her
to provide legal guidance, not to make business decisions. The attorney who
represents the DIP is not in the best position to make decisions about
shareholders' interests.
Courts may force attorneys into the role of business consultant and decision-
maker; attorneys assume these roles to avoid disqualification and to obtain full
compensation for work performed. In two recent cases, courts denied fees
requested by attorneys representing DIP's because the attorneys followed the
DIPs' business decisions. In the case of In re Liberty Trust Co.,54 the court
denied the requested attorneys' fees once the court found that the attorneys'
actions taken on behalf of the DIP could only have benefitted the DIP's
principals-not the DIP The attorneys had followed the decisions about the
reorganization made by the company's owner and manager acting in the role
of DIP 5 Thus, the court denied the attorneys' fees because the attorneys
followed the client's decision. This suggests that counsel should have
exercised their own judgment about the reorganization, instead of following
the objectives set forth by the DIP The case of In re Office Products of
America, Inc.51 involved a similar situation. Management serving as the DIP
opposed reconverting the Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation.
Counsel for the DIP supported their client's position. The court, however,
ruled that fighting the reconversion only benefitted management and
shareholders, not creditors and the estate. Consequently, the court denied
compensation for counsel representing interests of the DIP's principals.57
This case suggests that to obtain full compensation, counsel should have
exercised their own business judgment and decided whether to fight the
reconversion instead of merely following the DIP's wishes.
53. In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
54. Liberty Trust, 92 B.R. 706 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
55. Id. at 707.
56. Office Prods., 136 B.R. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
57. Id. at 991.
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B. Procedures for Compensation of Fees from the Estate
The procedure for compensating an attorney out of the estate involves filing
an application for compensation with the court.58 The attorney filing the
application may be seeking interim or final compensation. 9 An attorney may
apply for interim compensation once every 120 days.60 The application must
provide a "detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and
expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested."'( The court will only
grant reasonable compensation for actual and necessary services and
expenses.62
Once an application is filed, any party of interest may object to the request
for payment. These objections may be based on claims that the attorney's
action during the bankruptcy proceeding created a conflict of interest for the
attorney or that the attorney's work has not benefitted the estate and,
therefore, should not be compensated. At this point, the court will examine the
attorney's actions throughout the representation and will re-evaluate the
attorney's relationships with interested parties in the bankruptcy. If the court
finds that the attorney's actions created a conflict of interest or did not benefit
the estate, 63 the court may deny some or all compensation for counsel's
completed work."4 If the attorney makes a request for fees before the
bankruptcy representation is complete, the court may even disqualify counsel
from the case. 65 Thus, the court does not review an attorney's work until the
attorney makes a request for fees or another party files a motion against the
attorney Contrary to one court's statement, this does not "effectively police
participation by professionals in bankruptcy cases"; 66 effective policing
would involve court supervision before counsel and the DIP act on a decision
in the reorganization, not after their work is complete.
58. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330-331 (1988).
59. Id.; BANKR. R. 2016.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 331 ("[A]ny professional employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title may
apply to the court not more than once every 120 days or more often if the court permits.").
61. BANKR. R. 2016(a).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) ("After notice to any parties in interest, and a hearing, the court may
award reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services based on the nature, the extent,
and the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services
'); see In re Westside Creek Ltd. Partnership, 93 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1988) ("A fee
application should be specific enough to identify the legal services rendered so that, the Court can
determine the difficulty of the case and what results were achieved for the estate.").
63. In re Reed, 890 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1989) (disallowing fees for services performed for the debtor
which do not benefit the estate).
64. Ayer, supra note I, at 2-5 (discussing the 'case sanction' where the attorney is seeking
an award of fees from the bankruptcy estate, and the judge uses a finding of professional malpractice
to cut the fee request").
65. I1 U.S.C. § 329 (1988); BANKR. R. 2017.
66. See In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., 135 B.R 78, 88 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1990); supra note 9.
Describing total or partial disqualification as a "weapon to be used against professionals" suggests a
fight against intentional violations of Code provisions. Should we assume, in interpreting and applying
Code remedies for conflicts of interest, that all violations are intentional? Or, should we assume that
violations are unintentional mistakes resulting from misguidance?
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C. Lack of Guidance from Court Decisions Applying
Compensation Procedures
In recent decisions, courts have not hesitated to deny compensation for
attorneys' completed work that the courts have construed as creating a conflict
of interest or as not benefitting the estate.67 The courts' leniency in granting
motions for denial of fees is a disincentive for qualified attorneys even to
enter the bankruptcy arena.68 This disincentive is contrary to the goals of
Congress which, in setting the Code's compensation provisions, intended to
attract qualified attorneys to bankruptcy 69 The courts' leniency also provides
a wonderful tactical measure for interested parties to use against the DIP in
litigation.70 It would not be surprising to find the threat of filing a motion
against an attorney's request for compensation being used as a bargaining tool
for a party to gain power in the reorganization.
The concern for an attorney is not so much that there is a possibility of
disqualification or denial of fees after spending time working for the DIP The
concern is that after obtaining approval of the court to represent the DIP, an
attorney has little guidance on how to avoid future disqualification or denial
of fees. For example, in the case of In re Liberty Trust Co.,7 1 the attorneys
representing the DIP followed all the bankruptcy procedures for initial
approval to represent the DIP They-had engaged in what "they believed to be
the required, diligent representation of their client as instructed by the client's
owner and manager.172 The court denied the attorneys $4000 of their
requested final compensation from the estate even though the court never
provided any indication during the bankruptcy that there might be problems
with the representation.73
67. See, e.g., Reed, 890 F.2d 104; In re Grabill Corp., 110 B.R. 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re
Holden, 101 B.R. 573 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989); In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1988)
68. A ruling denying fees should not be made lightly since each decision increasing the number of
such rulings "inevitably discourages competent and honest counsel from accepting such representations
in the first place, or from diligently discharging their duties for fear of reprisals later in the case." In
re Office Prods. of Am., Inc., 136 B.R. 983, 988 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992); see also In re Guy Apple
Masonry Contractor, Inc., 45 B.R. 160 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984).
69. Congress, in passing the provisions for § 330, wanted compensation for bankruptcy work to be
comparable to compensation for non-bankruptcy work. Congress' purpose was to attract qualified
attorneys to the bankruptcy field. Without the incentives of comparable compensation in bankruptcy:
[b]ankruptcy specialists, who enable the system to operate smoothly, efficiently, and
expeditiously, would be driven elsewhere, and the bankruptcy field would be occupied by those
who could not find other work and those who practice bankruptcy law only occasionally almost
as a public service.
H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 329-30 (1977).
70. Disqualification motions, "which are collateral to the merits of a case, have substantially
increased in number and are used for purely tactical reasons." In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 846 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1985), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987); see also
Armstrong v. McAlpm, 625 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1980),judgment vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
71. Liberty Trust, 92 B.R. 706 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
72. Id. at 707.
73. Id. at 706.
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In a similar example, the court in the case of In re Office Products of
America, Inc.74 disallowed $10,315 of compensation for work the court
construed as benefitting the debtors, but not the estate. This court said that
there was a certain point in the proceedings in which the DIP should have
known that its interest in a reorganization was futile.75 Consequently, any
efforts of the attorneys to represent the DIP in the reorganization after this
point were uncompensable.7 6 Again, the court gave the attorneys little
indication during the proceeding that it would not compensate them for their
diligent representation of the DIP
Lack of guidance during the representation puts a tremendous burden on an
attorney to take only those actions she foresees the court approving and
compensating. Thus, counsel takes a risk when representing a DIP If the
attorney guesses incorrectly and engages in some action the court does not
approve, either because the court construes it as having created a conflict of
interest or because the court does not believe it benefitted the estate, the
attorney faces a retroactive punishment for guessing incorrectly "
In the case of In re Kendavis Industries International, the court, as a means
of disciplining counsel for inappropriate actions, disgorged fifty percent of
counsel's previously awarded fees.7" In this case, the Creditors Committee79
objected to counsel's fee application and moved for a disgorgement of fees.
The Committee stated that counsel represented the interests of the debtor's
principals rather than those of the DIP, resulting in a fatal conflict of
interest.80 The attorney defended his actions as being "reasonable, and in the
best interests of the estate."18 ' The court held for the Committee, stating that
because the debtors were insolvent, the stockholders held no recognizable
economic interest in the reorganization. Therefore, the attorney's efforts to
create a plan that benefitted the stockholders did not benefit the estate.82 In
the court's view, the DIP made the wrong business judgment decision when
it weighed the stockholders' interests too heavily 83
74. Office Prods., 136 B.1. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
75. Id. at 990.
76. Id.
77. See In re O'Connor, 52 B.R. 892, 900 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) ("[T]o permit the accrual of
legal fees and expenses only to grant a motion to disqualify debtor's counsel at some future date, strikes
us as most inequitable indeed.).
78. Kendavis, 91 B.R. 742, 748-49 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 19.88).
79. For a discussion of Creditors Committees, see II U.S.C. § 1102.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 749.
82. Id. The owners of a bankrupt firm may have a continuing interest in the reorganization even
if the firm is insolvent. If the owners can provide certain value to the reorganized firm that another
owner is not capable of providing, considerng the owners' interests would be in the best interest of the
firm. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text; see also Ayer, supra note 1, at 2-9 ("[A] number
of courts have insisted that even where the debtor is insolvent, equity has a place at the table and must
be included in negotiations.").
83. Kendavis, 91 B.R. at 749. The court also said that the attorney made the wrong decision in
objecting to the creditor's plan of reorganization because any objections could only benefit the
stockholders. Id. at 750. The court seems to suggest that objections by the attorney were misplaced since
no non-insider creditors objected to the plan. But no non-insider creditor would object to a plan that
provides for one hundred percent repayment ofnon-insider creditors! See also In re Guy Apple Masonry
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It seems obvious that in Kendavis an actual relationship existed between the
debtors' attorney and the controlling owners, resulting in a conflict of interest
for the attorney The implications of the Kendavis decision, however, are
troubling for a number of reasons. First, with the aid of hindsight, courts can
easily construe legitimate actions made for the benefit of the estate as being
biased in favor of the existing owners, thus creating a conflict of interest.8 4
Second, even if a court does not find a conflict of interest, the court may deny
fees based on an appearance of divided loyalty 85 One of the Kendavis
court's reasons for disallowing fees was an appearance of divided loyalty 86
Consequently, even if an attorney represents only the DIP, a court may still
find that the attorney, as a result of her actions, actually represented the
debtor. If, however, the Kendavis court's statement is true that counsel for the
DIP has some relationship with "equity holders, management directors, and
the like[,] '" then it is difficult to determine where to draw the line between
an appearance of impropriety and the fulfillment of legitimate obligations in
the representation.
The question remains for attorneys representing the DIP- How much can
they take the debtor's interests into account without representing conflicting
interests? One court recognized that an attorney must be extremely careful
since any action of the attorney is suspicious: "It is all too easy for an
attorney to drift into a relationship with management who is restructuring the
debtor which may be entirely adverse to the interests of the debtor in
possession. ' 8' This warning provides little guidance when attorneys try to
balance the competing demands of all the parties involved in the bankruptcy
proceeding. The warning may also be misdirected since the real problem may
not lie with the attorney but with the client who is disloyal to its relationship
with counsel that is based on trust. One court denied part of the fees of
counsel for the DIP but stated that the real reason for failings in the
representation may have been the client's dishonesty 89 The client had
arranged for a third party to act as an outside advisor, thus violating
bankruptcy standards. The debtor and outside advisor were not forthright with
the attorney about the arrangement; they were careful not to actually lie to the
attorney, but were also careful not to disclose too much. Even if the attorney
Contractor, Inc., 45 B.R. 160, 167 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984).
84. In Kendavis, the court admitted that each piece of evidence, taken alone, would have been
insufficient to establish that the attorney represented the controlling stockholders. Nonetheless, the court
felt that the totality of the evidence could only lead to that conclusion. Kendavws, 91 B.R. at 751.
85. In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 837 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) ("[T"he penalty serves a prophylactic
purpose. It strikes not only at actual evil [fraudulent conduct], but at the tendency of divided loyalty to
create evil."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 75 B.R. 402 (Bankr. D. Utah C.D. 1987);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 328(c).
86. Kendavis, 91 B.R. at 753 (stating that even if the law firm arguably did not represent the
controlling shareholders, "their actions throughout the case point to an inescapable appearance to
the contrary").
87. Id. at 755; see supra text accompanying note 40.
88. In re Vanderbilt Assocs., Ltd., Ill B.R. 347, 356 (Bankr. D. Utah), rev'd, 117 B.R. 678 (D.
Utah 1990).
89. In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925, 938 n.18 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992).
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had attempted to better supervise the client, the court admitted that he may
have been "rebuffed by the actual, behind-the-scenes control" of the third
party.90
One bankruptcy court recognized that a client may direct counsel to take
action that may not benefit the estate.9' This leaves the attorney the option
of either ignoring the client's wishes or working with no assurance of
compensation. In the case of In re Grabill Corp.,92 the court decided to limit
but not deny all of the attorney's compensation. Otherwise, it "would
effectively penalize [the attorney] for following [the client's] directions."93
The court came to this conclusion even though the attorney's work was of no
benefit to the estate.
Management, in the role of DIP, has its own concerns during the bankruptcy
that may affect the DIP's view of the reorganization. Namely, management's
career interests are at stake; "[m]anagement is seen as self-evidently interested
in their own salaries and prerequisites, in preservation of the company and
therefore their jobs, and in their reputation as effective managers."94 In small
business reorganizations where shareholders are also managers, those
managers often retain their positions in the surviving entity " In large
business reorganizations existing managers are not as likely to keep their jobs
after the reorganization since they are easily replaced.96 Considering these
pressures on management, counsel for the DIP not only must guard against
unintentional violations of the "disinterested" and "no adverse interest"
requirements, but may also have to fight against intentional violations as the
DIP tries to take actions that serve management's own interests.97
Present Code procedures do not alleviate the pressure on attorneys to walk
the fine line between adequately representing the estate in a successful
reorganization and over-emphasizing equity owners interests, to the point that
the representation fails. Once an attorney is initially approved, the court does
not review the attorney's work until either the attorney petitions for fees or
an interested party files a motion against the attorney. In both of these
situations, the court examines the work after it is complete. The court decides
after the fact whether the attorney has acted appropriately For an attorney to
successfully obtain compensation, the attorney must have accurately predicted
during the bankruptcy which actions and plans the court would approve or
disapprove. Forecasting how a plan adopted today will work out and be
viewed by a court tomorrow is not an easy task.
Forcing an attorney to predict the success of a plan may encourage the
attorney to counsel the DIP to make safe, conservative business decisions
90. Id.
91. In re Grabill Corp., 110 B.R. 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
92. Id. at 361.
93. Id.
94. Corporate Governance, supra note 45, at 710.
95. Bargaing over Equity's Share, supra note 49, at 149.
96. Id. at 149-50.
97. Id. at 151 & n.54 (discussing how management can serve its self-interest in a reorganization).
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throughout the reorganization, even when conservative approaches may not be
in the best interest of the estate. For example, suppose the DIP proposes a
plan to invest $1 million, with a fifty percent chance of yielding $2 million
and a fifty percent chance of yielding nothing. The Creditors Committee wants
to liquidate the debtor and distribute the proceeds. Which plan should counsel
favor99 Without assurances that the court will not find the attorney's choice
to favor the DIP's plan as placing the debtor's interests before those of the
estate, most attorneys would choose the creditors' plan. Counsel would
thereby encourage the DIP to follow the plan that is most likely to benefit
counsel in the end, even if another plan might be more beneficial to the
estate. In essence, counsel is making business decisions about the reorganiza-
tion that favor counsel's interests. Until courts provide more guidance as to
how far debtors' interests can be considered, attorneys will continue to make
business decisions by influencing their clients to take actions that the attorney
believes the court will approve. Under current procedures, attorneys have little
incentive to take risks that, if successful, will benefit the estate, but if
unsuccessful, might damage their chances of receiving compensation.
D. Lack of Guidance from Rules of Professional Responsibility
The rules governing professional conduct provide little guidance for an
attorney trying to make decisions that benefit the estate in the collective
proceeding, while simultaneously trying to avoid the appearance of a
conflicting interest.99 One reason for this is that compliance with the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") requires a clear understanding of the
client's identity and interests. For example, the Comment to Rule 1.3 says:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite
opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a
client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client's behalf 00
In bankruptcy the identity and interests of the DIP are not clearly defined and
may change throughout the proceeding.' 0 '
98. Ayer, supra note 1, at 2-7 to 2-8.
A superficial review of the facts will cause many readers to favor the creditors because any
other result will permit the debtor to "gamble with other peoples' money." But one could
just as well say that too-rapid liquidation may permit the creditors to foreclose the debtor out
of a valuable opportunity.
Id. at 2-8.
99. See Carol W. Gustavson, The Ethical Role of a Debtor's Attorney in a Consumer Bankruptcy
Filing, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 684 (1993).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.3 cmt. (1992).
101. See John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355, 387
(1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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Another reason the MRPC provide little guidance is that, except for Rule
1.13, 12 the MRPC are written for traditional two-party legal proceed-
ings 0 3 where counsel serves in an adversarial role."'s Bankruptcy,
however, is a complex bargaining process involving more than two parties
who are not clearly aligned one against another;" 5 "the corporate debtor
will be a complex of constituencies, including not only creditors but also a
board of directors, management, and shareholders."0 6 An attorney's duty is
to help the client, the DIP, sort through the interests of these multiple
parties. 0 7 This is not an easy task because "[t]hese parties may be divided
on some issues; even when united, their views may change from circumstance
to circumstance, or from time to time." '
One rule an attorney may be forced to violate in order to obtain compensa-
tion is MRPC 1.2. Under this rule, an attorney has a duty to allow the client
to set the objectives of the representation while the attorney determines the
means.' O9 Does setting the objectives include controlling decisions about
whose interests the reorganization will serve? If so, an attorney has a real
dilemma. The DIP and the attorney may have different opinions of what
actions create a conflict or are in the best interests of the estate." 0 What the
client believes is in the best interest of the estate may not be in the best
interest of the attorney with regard to compensation. To be compensated, the
attorney will want to follow her own business judgment decision. To be in
compliance with Rule 1.2, however, the attorney may need to follow the
DIP's decisions.
Is there a violation of professional ethics if the attorney decides not to
follow the client's wishes? Could the DIP bring suit against counsel for such
a volation?"' Even if not, there is nonetheless tension between the client
and the attorney The conflict is not over the legal means to be employed; the
102. Rule 1.13 embodies the entity-client theory for counsel representing a corporation. Counsel,
when representing an organization, "represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.13(a) (1992).
103. In re Paine, 14 B.R. 272, 275 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) (referring to American United Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940)).
104. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a
Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 471 (1989).
105. "In ordinary cases, you usually know who is your friend and who [is] your enemy. In
bankruptcy, it isn't always so clear. In some cases, creditors find themselves allied against the debtor.
But often, creditors break ranks." Ayer, supra note 1, at 2-5; see also In re Vanderbilt Assocs., Ltd.,
I ll B.R. 347, 352 (Bankr. D. Utah) (noting that, in bankruptcy proceedings, "many parties in interest
are unrepresented"), rev'd, 117 B.R. 678 (Bankr. C.D. Utah 1990).
106. In re Colomal Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1021-22 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
107. Id. at 1022.
108. Id., see also Ayer, supra note 101, at 386-87.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2 (1992).
110. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
111. The Model Rules contain a disclaimer that the Rules should not provide the basis for civil
liability. MODEL RLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Scope (1992). But some have argued that the
"Model Rules should be 'rules of the lawyer's legal obligations and not expressions of hope as to what
a lawyer ought to do."' Ann Peters, Note, The Model Rules as a Guidefor Legal Malpractice 6 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHIcs 609, 611 (1993) (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and
Professional Aspirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 571, 574 (1982)).
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conflict is over the issue of which business decisions are in the best interests
of the estate.
III. SOLUTION
There is a way to remove the uncertainties now linked to conflicts of
interest and compensation of attorneys representing DIP's. The solution is to
modify bankruptcy procedures to encourage DIP attorneys, and to require
other interested parties to raise conflict of interest issues as soon as they arise.
As the Kendavis court discussed, current procedures do not allow bankruptcy
courts to adequately monitor conflicts of interest:
[H]ow can a bankruptcy court monitor conflicts of interest when these
matters come before the court in less than obvious ways? Unless a court
is extremely experienced in bankruptcy tactics and negotiations, or unless
a party in interest brings the matter before the court with a "smoking gun,"
no effective manner exists to monitor this problem." 2
Raising conflict of interest concerns when they arise will permit courts to
target potential problems in their infancy before they develop into full grown
conflicts. Counsel and the DIP will then have the opportunity to change their
course of action before counsel completes hours of work that the court will
not approve or compensate.
A. Additional Procedures
First, the court may require parties in interest to raise concerns about the
counsel's representation of the DIP as soon as they arise. Under existing
procedures, if an interested party has an objection to counsel's representation
of the DIP, that party does not have to voice those objections immediately. A
bankruptcy court cannot effectively monitor conflicts of interest "when these
matters come before the court in less than obvious ways[,]" that is, when "a
party in interest brings the matter before the court with a 'smoking
gun[.]"' "' The party can serve its own interests by saving the objection
until the most opportune moment and then bringing it to the court's
attention. 114
Requiring interested parties to bring objections to the court as soon as the
parties become aware of them will warn counsel for the DIP that, without
modifications, additional work put into the proposal will meet with objections
when counsel later petitions for fees. Armed with such knowledge, counsel
can better advise the DIP on the proper course of action to take with regard
to the proposal. In addition, requiring immediate objections negates the threat
112. In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
113. Id.
114. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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of an opposing party filing a motion against an attorney's request for fees as
a means of gaining greater bargaining strength."'
To further protect against denial of fees, the DIP's counsel needs a
procedure under which she can have actions reviewed which other parties
might unfairly characterize as serving conflicting interests. Concerns over
client confidentiality and reorganization tactics that would be foiled by
disclosure limit those actions that counsel can reveal to other interested
parties. Still, counsel should be able to take some precautions with less
sensitive matters in order to protect herself from future attacks when she
petitions for fees.
For example, if counsel believes that creditors could perceive the DIP's
suggested plan as involving a conflicting interest for counsel, counsel could
submit a statement to the court indicating her concern and could file a motion
for review of the issue. The statement and motion would trigger heightened
scrutiny The court could then conduct an in camera review for sensitive
matters or pass on the statement to all interested parties for their review This
would shift the burden to the other interested parties to investigate the issue
and object to the action within a specified period or else lose the objection
later when counsel petitions for fees.
As discussed previously, a bankruptcy court could not require counsel for
the DIP to file a statement with the court every time counsel has concerns.
Being given the option, however, counsel can weigh the value of not voicing
her concerns initially against the risk involved in waiting until she petitions
for fees to resolve conflict of interest challenges.
An advantage to providing procedures for disclosure throughout the
representation is that it allows counsel for the DIP to leave business decision-
making to the client. If the DIP wants to consider shareholders' interests in
a reorganization plan, and counsel for the DIP questions whether such a level
of shareholder involvement is appropriate, counsel can obtain review of her
concerns. Instead of counsel guessing as to how other parties will view the
DIP's plan, and influencing the DIP's actions based upon that guess, counsel
has a clear indication of the other parties' views beforehand." 6
B. Incorporating Procedures Under the Code
Congress does not need to alter Bankruptcy Code provisions to encourage
the DIP's counsel, and to require other interested parties, to raise conflict
issues when they occur. Bankruptcy courts already have this power under §
105.27 This section provides the court with general equitable powers to
115. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
116. To understand the impact of disclosure procedures on business decision-making, see the
example supra note 100 and accompanying text. DIP's counsel could favor the DIP's proposal over the
Creditors Committee's proposal without the risk of losing fees. Thus, counsel's desire to be paid will
not dictate a conservative approach to the reorganization that might not be in the best interest of the
estate.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1992).
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enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." 8 They are given the
authority to issue any necessary orders, processes, or judgments., 9
Bankruptcy courts may exercise equitable powers if the powers are tied to
"another Bankruptcy Code section and not merely to a general bankruptcy
concept or objective."' 2 Ordering disclosure complies with this requirement.
The bankruptcy court is responsible for initially approving counsel, ruling on
conflicts of interest, and awarding attorneys' fees. Requesting that concerns
regarding these areas be brought to the court's attention immediately, rather
than haphazardly, aids the court in its designated functions, not just in
furthering general bankruptcy policy
Bankruptcy courts' equitable powers are not unlimited, however. Courts
may not use the powers to contravene specific provisions of the Code.' 2'
Again, ordering disclosure complies with this requirement. There are no
specific provisions that prohibit bankruptcy courts from granting a motion by
the DIP or from issuing a general order requiring parties to reveal conflict
concerns when they arise.
CONCLUSION
The problems in current bankruptcy procedures not only impact attorneys'
ability to receive compensation, they also affect the efficient disposition of
bankruptcy cases. Attorneys who spend time on work for which a court will
not permit compensation prolong the bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore,
litigation collateral to the bankruptcy, involving claims of conflicts of
interests and denial of fees, wastes judicial resources. Increased disclosure
permits collective discussion on issues confronting the DIP's counsel before
major problems develop. The increased guidance from these collective
discussions will help prevent counsel from getting involved in situations that
create a conflict in the representation and will keep counsel from wasting
efforts on work that does not benefit the estate. The costs of implementing
disclosure procedures are minimal if courts use their equitable powers under
§ 105. Advantages to the orderly disposition of the bankruptcy process far
outweigh any costs that may result.
118. "The use of 'necessary or appropriate' is in keeping with congressional intent that bankruptcy
courts deal with all phases and aspects of a bankruptcy proceeding." Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81,
84 n.10 (2d Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Sundstrom Mortgage Co. v. 2218 Bluebird Ltd. Partnership (In re 2218
Bluebird Ltd. Partnership), 41 B.R. 540, 544 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that bankruptcy courts
have inherent power under § 105 to sanction parties in order "to protect the orderly administration of
justice and maintain the authority and dignity of the Court").
119. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
120. 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 105.01 (3d ed. 1993).
121. E.g., Childress v. Middleton Arms, Ltd. Partnership (In re Middleton Arms, Ltd. Partnership),
119 B.L 131, 132 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (stating that a bankruptcy court may not use its equitable powers
to approve a debtor's application to employ a.real estate agent when such approval contravenes the
"disinterested" requirement of § 327(a)), aff'd, 934 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1991); In re French, Il1 B.R.
391, 394 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that § 105 may not be used to circumvent § 327's express
provisions).
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